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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE NUMBERS DILEMMA: THE CHIMERA OF MODERN POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS

JAMES F. GILSINAN*
INTRODUCTION
In the lexicon of dyadic American folk sayings, “motherhood and apple
pie” is being joined by “transparency and accountability.” Similarly, like
“motherhood and apple pie,” one takes on the iconic nature of the saying at
considerable risk. After all, who could be against transparency and
accountability? Management guru Stephen R. Covey argues that,
“[a]ccountability breeds response-ability.”1 This formulation neatly captures
the assumed relationship between accountability and performance. There is
also an assumed relationship between transparency and a robust democratic
system.2 Journalist Peter Finn notes, a “basic tenet of a healthy democracy is
open dialogue and transparency.”3 Finally, accountability and transparency are
seen as reinforcing each other.4 Being held accountable assumes that one’s
actions are available for review and critique.5 Indeed, the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed in the wake of the recent
financial meltdown, attempts to regulate the disclosure requirements of
financial firms on the assumption that such mandated transparency will result
in better performance on the part of banks and other financial institutions.6
Police departments in the United States and elsewhere have been quick to
jump on the transparency and accountability bandwagon.7 The increasing use

* E. Desmond Lee Professor in Collaborative Regional Education, Department of Public Policy
Studies, Saint Louis University.
1. STEPHEN R. COVEY, PRINCIPLE-CENTERED LEADERSHIP 49 (1990).
2. Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the
Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 924 (1999).
3. Peter Fenn, POLITICO: THE ARENA (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.politico.com/arena/
perm/Peter_Fenn_149A409A-FDA2-41EA-ACA1-41133DF86F66.html.
4. Joshua N. Auerbach, Police Accountability in Kenya, 3 AFR. HUM. RTS. L. J. 275, 282
(2003).
5. Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. R. 29, 29 (2005).
6. Cody Vitello, The Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 & What it Means for Joe & Jane
Consumer, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 101 (2010).
7. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1163 (2000).
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of accessible, web-based, real time crime data, using geographic information
system (GIS) technology to display neighborhood crime patterns, represents
the move toward transparency on the part of major city police departments.8
Similarly, the rapid adoption of COMPSTAT–like programs in mid to large
size departments speaks to a willingness to be held accountable for crime
occurrences and their control.9 Unfortunately, there are a multitude of reasons
why systems designed to increase transparency and accountability will not
work and, in fact, may make the very goals sought by programs of
organizational reform less likely to be achieved.
In this Article, I argue that there are five obstacles facing police reformers
seeking to increase transparency and accountability in law enforcement
organizations.10 Moreover, these obstacles are nearly insurmountable.11 The
phrase “nearly insurmountable” means that while change can and will occur,
the changes will, at best, be at the margins of the organization—and, at worst,
such changes may make situations in need of correction more problematic.12
This pessimistic assessment is due to the nature of the numbers themselves; the
nature of organizations, particularly those that do not produce an objective
product; the culture of policing; the institutional environment in which the
police operate; and the larger cultures’ failure to distinguish among the
concepts of data, information, and knowledge.13
I. THE SIREN SONG OF COUNTING AND NUMBERS
When presented with a table of numbers that purport to objectively
measure or describe a phenomenon, in keeping with the dictates of
accountability or transparency, or both, the reader is often lulled into a state of
process amnesia. Numbers are always the end product of a series of decisions,
many of which are subjective and somewhat arbitrary.14 There are at least six
decision points that affect the “objective” nature of the numbers being
reported.15 The first is obviously the decision to count one thing rather than
another.16

8. Id. at 1175.
9. John R. Firman, Deconstructing COMPSTAT to Clarify its Intent, 2 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 457, 458 (2003).
10. See infra Parts I-V.
11. See Gary W. Sykes, The Functional Nature of Police Reform: The ‘Myth’ of Controlling
the Police, 2 JUST. Q. 51, 53 (1985).
12. Id.
13. See infra note 37.
14. Craig D. Uchida, Carol Bridgeforth & Charles F. Wellford, Law Enforcement Statistics:
The State of the Art, 5 AM. J. POLICE 23, 29 (1986).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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The simple act of deciding to count or not count something confers or
denies a certain importance to an object or outcome. A number of criminal
justice examples illustrate the point.
Until the early 1970s, domestic assault did not “count” as a serious
offense.17 On the other hand, homosexual activity between consenting adults
did “count” as a crime.18 In fact, why do we bother to count crime at all? Those
familiar with the history and the development of the FBI Uniform Crime
Reports (UCR) know the reason certain kinds of crime were counted was
motivated by a political goal: shielding top police officials from the periodic
crime crusades of the tabloid press.19 The sensationalism of crime reporting,
and the consequent threat to the job stability of a police chief, literally could be
count-ered by the “objectivity” of numbers.20 Of course, since its beginning,
the UCR has been plagued by a second subjective decision point prior to
arriving at a number: What counts as an instance of a phenomenon?21
The specifically political nature of this decision point is noted by Deborah
Stone who points out that counting requires classification, which in turn
requires judgments about inclusion and exclusion—who or what is in or out.22
Again, the history of the UCR nicely illustrates this dilemma. Crime categories
have been known to expand or contract depending on the circumstances at
hand.23 Thus, a municipality heavily dependent on tourism may employ very
narrow definitions of what constitutes a criminal act, thereby keeping crime
rates low. At budget time, a crime wave, based on expanding the category of
what counts as a crime, may be helpful in obtaining additional resources.
The third decision point that illustrates the subjective nature of a number is
the choice of a procedure for counting to one.24 This may seem
straightforward—one thing is one thing. But alas, one thing may be made up of
multiple parts; thus, the question becomes whether to count the parts separately
or as a unit. The UCR solves this dilemma by introducing a time dimension in

17. Faith E. Lutze & Megan L. Symons, The Evolution of Domestic Violence Policy
Through Masculine Institutions: From Discipline to Protection to Collaborative Empowerment, 2
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 319, 322 (2003).
18. Bennett Wolff, Expanding the Right of Sexual Privacy, 27 LOY. L. REV. 1279, 1281
(1981).
19. Michael D. Maltz, Crime Statistics: A Historical Perspective, 23 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 32, 33 (1977).
20. Id. at 33–34.
21. Id.
22. DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 146
(3d ed. 2002).
23. Crime Reporting in the Age of Technology, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. (Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C.), 2000, at 12.
24. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

96

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII:93

deciding how to count to one.25 For example, if a car is vandalized as part of a
series of auto vandalisms that all occurred within the same, designated time
period, then that incident is counted as one occurrence of vandalism, even if
twenty cars were involved.26
The above example introduces the fourth challenge to numeric
objectivity—the inability to understand what a number means unless the
context in which the number was produced is also provided.27 Put another way,
this is the siren song of numbers. Numbers appear to be objective and not
tainted by context.28 Moreover, with too much contextual description, the
elegant efficiency of numeric description is lost. This is a particular problem in
attempting to use numbers either to provide transparency or to improve
performance through accountability.29 There is a well-known aphorism that
attests to the need for context:
The Government are very keen on amassing statistics—they collect them, add
them, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful
diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of those figures comes in
the first instance from chowly dar (village watchman), who just puts down
30
what he damn pleases.

This nineteenth century British warning continues to be of relevance in
assessing modern, twenty-first century police intelligence units charged with
analyzing data for the construction of actionable law enforcement
interventions.31 In a recent study of British police intelligence analysis units,
one analyst is quoted as saying, “the quota of information that we work on is as
good as the officer puts on there. If you look at the standards of the [officers’]
reports, they’re absolutely appalling. You know, and they’ve got the house
number wrong, they’ve got the beat wrong.”32 The respondent goes on to note
that these mistakes result in the identification of false hot spots—places of
peak crime occurrences.33 The important point of this, however, is that the
analysts make the best of the data they are given and report a de-contextualized
version of an event (a series of numbers). As the authors note, those numbers
fail to convey either the fluid nature of a criminal occurrence, and, thus, some

25. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
HANDBOOK 12 (2004).
26. Id.
27. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
28. See Uchida, Bridgeforth & Wellford, supra note 14, at 25.
29. See Martin Innes et al., ‘The Appliance of Science?’ The Theory and Practice of Crime
Intelligence Analysis, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 50–52 (2005).
30. JOSIAH STAMP, SOME ECONOMIC FACTORS OF MODERN LIFE 258–59 (1929).
31. Innes et al., supra note 29, at 50–52.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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of its underlying causes, or the interpretive work of the analyzer who fills in
gaps in the data so that it becomes “sensical.”34
The inability to convey context exacerbates a fifth characteristic of
numbers, the objectification of evaluative criteria—i.e., disguising judgment as
measurement.35 Deborah Stone gives a wonderful example of this process:
“Paul Samuelson’s best-selling (economic) textbook declared in its 1970
edition that full–employment was about 3.5 percent unemployment; by the
time of its 1985 edition, the natural rate of unemployment had grown to around
6 percent.”36
Of course, today, the Obama administration would celebrate a 7 percent
unemployment rate. The tendency of numbers to disguise a judgment as a
measurement makes it difficult to hold the entities reporting the numbers
accountable and to ensure organizational transparency.37
Finally, as noted previously, the act of counting something confers a status
on, or suggests the importance of, the thing counted.38 Therefore, both the
counter and the counted react to the process of numbering.39 Organizationally,
this refers to producing good numbers whether the entity is a police agency
employing COMPSTAT or a school system participating in high stakes testing.
The number becomes a goal in and of itself—separate from what the number
represents. This unfortunately became the experience of the NYPD over the
course of implementing COMPSTAT.40 In a study by John Eterno and Eli
Silverman, field commanders quickly learned that they needed to look good
(i.e. have good numbers) when presenting at COMPSTAT meetings if they
wanted to avoid public humiliation.41 This resulted first in commanders
spending inordinate amounts of time constructing data charts, rather than
actually implementing the crime control strategies that the analysis might have
suggested.42 Secondly, there was a strong temptation to manipulate the
numbers.43 Thus, to truly understand what a number means, it is necessary to
know about the organization that produces the number. It is to this issue that
we now turn.

34. Id.
35. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
36. STONE, supra note 22, at 169.
37. Id. at 176–77.
38. Id. at 178.
39. Id. at 187.
40. See John A. Eterno & Eli B. Silverman, The New York City Police Department’s
Compstat: Dream or Nightmare?, 8 INT’L J. OF POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 218, 219–26 (2006).
41. Id. at 223.
42. Id. at 228.
43. Id. at 227.
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS AND THE PROBLEM OF REFORM
Daniel Kahneman, in a popular summary of current brain research,
suggests that there are, at least metaphorically, two systems that control
thinking.44 System one is intuitive, quick thinking, and bases conclusions on
mental frames developed through past experience.45 These frames or beliefs
are the templates used to explain the world as someone encounters it.46 System
two is slower and engages in deliberative assessments of information.47
However, system two responses require effort, and according to Kahneman,
system two often lacks the requisite effort.48 Therefore, if system one presents
an explanation that seems to make sense and accords with past experience,
system two will accept the conclusions of system one without further analysis
and critique.49
This observation is parallel to an observation made by Herbert Simon
about organizational decision-making.50 Decision-making in organizations
does not involve analyzing all of the information available, but, instead, is
represented by a process of “satisficing.”51 The decision-maker uses rules of
thumb, that is, how this current situation is like a previous situation and what
the appropriate response was in that previous situation.52 The use of analogous
situations to make decisions mirror what has been discovered by brain
research—neither as individuals nor as members of organizations do we
optimize our decision-making, picking the best of all possible alternatives.
Instead, we satisfice, picking the alternative that best seems to fit, without
expending a great deal of energy to review—in a systematic way—all other
possible choices.53
Of course, this approach, both individually and organizationally, has some
advantages.54 It conserves energy and allows for efficient decision-making.55
In most cases, such decision-making processes or standard operating

44. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20 (2011).
45. Id. at 105.
46. Id. at 21–22.
47. Id. at 49.
48. Id. at 31.
49. Id. at 24.
50. KEVIN B. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER W. LARIMER, THE PUBLIC POLICY THEORY PRIMER
54 (2009).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 52.
53. Id. at 52–53.
54. See id. at 53.
55. Id. at 54.
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procedures result in the individual or the organization moving forward to
accomplish the task at hand.56
The disadvantage of this course of action is that often individuals and
organizations do not engage in an analytical process that would prevent major
problems.57 Higher order analytical routines are most often employed after the
fact—what went wrong and why?58 Post-mortems sometimes result in changed
ways of behaving, but these soon become standard operating procedures and
satisficing once again becomes the preferred mode of decision-making.59
This suggests that changing the core activity of an organization and its
routines of decision-making is very, very difficult.60 This may be particularly
true in the public sector, where assessing performance is hindered by the lack
of a concrete product or outcome.61 Performance criteria are instead influenced
by political considerations, budgets, and the public mood.62
In this kind of decision environment, it makes sense to ask whether any
particular decision is based on technical or institutional criteria. A decision
based on technical criteria responds to a change in the outside environment.63
A new product or service is required to keep the organization competitive.64
Therefore, structures are designed or redesigned to efficiently and effectively
meet this demand.65 The organization that successfully navigates its
environment’s technical demands is rewarded with more resources.66 Failure to
do so jeopardizes resources.67 When an organization employs technical
decision processes, it is engaging in a more sophisticated and analytical routine
than simply satisficing.68
A decision based on institutional criteria is much closer to the satisficing
model or the system one brain model.69 The criteria for judging the success of

56. KEVIN B. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER W. LARIMER, THE PUBLIC POLICY THEORY PRIMER
54 (2009).
57. See id. at 53; K. A. Archibald, Three Views of the Expert’s Role in Policymaking:
Systems Analysis, Incrementalism, and the Clinical Approach, 1 POL’Y SCI. 73, 76, 82 (1970).
58. See Archibald, supra note 57, at 76.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 82.
61. SMITH & LARIMER, supra note 50, at 114–15.
62. See id.
63. See Sidney G. Winter, The Satisficing Principle in Capability Learning, 21 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J., 981, 982 (2000).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 983; James Willis et al., Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based
Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 147,
150 (2007).
67. See Winter, supra note 63, at 982.
68. Id. at 983.
69. See Willis et al., supra note 66, at 151.
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the organization involve neither efficiency nor effectiveness.70 The criteria
instead involve judging the legitimacy of the organization based on cultural
beliefs about how an organization should look and act.71 Perceived legitimacy
rather than efficacy is what counts.72 Organizations operating in this kind of
decision climate gain recognition and resources by: conforming to cultural
beliefs and expectations about what it is they are supposed to do; and by
becoming isomorphic with other institutions in their environment that have
been rewarded for particular behaviors.73
Research describing the adoption of COMPSTAT suggests that the
adoption has been spurred primarily by institutional considerations.74 The rapid
deployment of COMPSTAT mirrors an almost fadlike acceptance of the
process rather than a careful and analytical investigation of how the process
might adopt to a particular local situation or what pros and cons such adoption
might entail.75
Change spurred by the dynamic of institutional isomorphism is likely to be
superficial.76 Core technologies and procedures are unlikely to be impacted.77
This certainly seems to be the case with COMPSTAT.78
In a study of three police departments that had adopted COMPSTAT,
James Willis and his colleagues concluded that COMPSTAT simply raised
reactive policing strategies to new levels. Police would respond quickly to a
spike in crime, producing what the authors called a “whack-a-mole” effect.79
Contrary to the assumptions of careful planning and the development of long
term strategies, COMPSTAT simply encouraged business as usual, only even
more so.80 Further, while commanders felt responsible for crime in their
districts, there was very little communication to beat officers concerning
COMPSTAT trends—with the result that officers’ daily routines were not
impacted by the analysis derived from the gathered data.81

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Matthew J. Giblin, Structural Elaboration and Institutional Isomorphism: The Case of
Crime Analysis Units, 29 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 643, 645 (2006).
73. Id.
74. Willis et al., supra note 66, at 161.
75. Eterno & Silverman, supra note 40, at 219.
76. Matthew J. Giblin & George W. Burruss, Developing a Measurement Model of
Institutional Processes in Policing, 32 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT., 351,
355 (2009).
77. See id.
78. See Willis et al. supra note 66, at 152, 174–75.
79. Id. at 174.
80. Id. at 175.
81. Id. at 164–65.
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Other studies have suggested that COMPSTAT also increased the gulf
between the command culture and the street cop culture.82 For example, in
New York, commanders took credit for dips in the crime rate, while passing
blame to subordinates if the crime rate spiked in an area.83
The concept of work culture is an important element in trying to
understand why organizational change in general, and change toward more
accountability and transparency, in particular, is difficult to achieve.84 In public
sector agencies, the organizational dynamics just described, together with the
cultural dynamics of such organizations, make the likelihood of fundamental
change even more remote.85 We turn to the role of cultural dynamics next.
III. THE CULTURES OF MODERN DAY POLICING
Our understanding of the cultural complexity of the modern police agency
has come a long way from the studies of the 1970s, which concentrated
primarily on the culture of the street officer.86 By the end of the decade, it was
clear that police organizations had at least two distinct cultures: a street cop
culture and a management culture.87 Today, it is recognized that there are
multiple cultures within police agencies consisting not only of beat officers and
higher ranked managers—but civilian cultures which span a fairly large
professional hierarchy from clerical support staff, through 911 call-takers and
dispatchers, to highly trained and credentialed personnel in such units as
research and development, human resource management, and forensics.88
Although not studied quite as intensively as the police subcultures, these
other subcultures are beginning to receive more attention.89 In a study this
Author conducted on police call-takers, it was evident their work culture was
influenced by the stress and strains of being street level bureaucrats with too

82. Eterno & Silverman, supra note 40, at 222–23.
83. Id. at 224.
84. Linda Smircich, Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
339, 346 (1983).
85. Peter J. Robertson & Sonal J. Senevir, Outcomes of Planned Organizational Change in
the Public Sector: A Meta-Analytic Comparison to the Private Sector, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547,
548 (1995).
86. See JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 57 (4th ed. 2011).
87. ELIZABETH REUSS-IANNI, TWO CULTURES OF POLICING: STREET COPS AND
MANAGEMENT COPS 1 (1983).
88. David A. Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New
Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1209–10, 1229–30
(2006).
89. See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN & MEGAN A. ALDERDEN, NAT’L. INST. OF JUSTICE, JOB
SATISFACTION AMONG CIVILIANS IN POLICING 1 (2011), available at http://www.nationalpolice
research.org/job-satisfaction-among-civilia/.
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few resources to meet increasing demands.90 Many of the strategies they
adopted were attempts to gain greater control over their work situation while
still trying to meet the demands for service emanating from 911 calls.91 Chief
among the strategies they employed was attempting to fit a caller’s demand
into a pre-existing definition of a situation that permitted the dispatch of a
car.92 Call-takers would often prompt callers as to how to appropriately frame
their request.93 A key conclusion of this study was that police agencies do not
respond directly to a situation, but instead respond to an organizationally
projected frame that takes ambiguous information and forms it into an
understandable pattern to which the agency can then respond in a routine
fashion.94
A similar conclusion was reached in a study conducted by this Author and
a colleague focused on a police research and development (R&D) unit.95 The
source of the ambiguous information for this unit was demands for data that
would help other organizational units within the department make a decision
about a problematic situation.96 Interestingly, the problem-solving sequence for
the R&D unit did not start with an analysis of the problem they were supposed
to research, but with an analysis of the political situation and the agenda of the
person making the request.97 Once there was consensus on the real agenda and
on a solution that would meet both political and practical realities, “research”
was conducted to support this solution.98 Often, the research consisted of
calling other police R&D units to see what they suggested in similar
circumstances.99 This closed system of information processing allowed the
organization to do what it would normally do anyway.100 “Research” simply
reinforced standard operating procedures.101
More recent research on police research units reinforces these initial
observations.102 Martin Innes and his colleagues adopt the term “bricolage” to
describe the tasks performed by crime analysts in two British police
90. See James F. Gilsinan, They is Clowning Tough: 911 and the Social Construction of
Reality, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 332 (1989).
91. See id.
92. Id. at 332–33.
93. See id. at 340.
94. Id. at 341.
95. See generally James F. Gilsinan & J.R. Valentine, Bending Granite: Attempts to Change
the Management Perspective of American Criminologists and Police Reformers, 15 J. POLICE
SCI. & ADMIN. 196 (1987).
96. See id. at 197–98.
97. Id. at 198–99.
98. See id. at 199.
99. Id. at 197.
100. Id. at 202, 203.
101. James F. Gilsinan & J.R. Valentine, supra note 95, at 203. (1987).
102. Innes et al., supra note 29, at 54–55.
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agencies.103 Crime analysts work with what they are given and take messy,
contingent, and incomplete data to construct an objective, scientific product.104
They put together the bric-a-brac of what they receive from field reports and
construct a coherent pattern of events.105 The gaps in data are filled in by what
everybody knows to be “true” about how criminals operate.106 The resulting
product is a reproduction of the world that allows the department to enact its
environment, i.e. project an image of a situation that allows for the carrying out
of standard operating procedures.107
While units that can contribute to transparency and accountability do not
operate in ways that can easily achieve either characteristic, there are forces
within the constellation of institutions of which any police agency is a part that
encourages the particular organizational and cultural dynamics previously
discussed.108
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
To paraphrase a piece of folk wisdom, no institution is an island.
Institutions exist as part of a constellation of similar agencies.109 This
institutional ecology creates a dynamic in which like organizations compete,
cooperate, and engage in mutual adjustment.110 Similar organizations also
provide a benchmark against which other organizations can be assessed.111
A large body of research points to the different dynamics that exist in
public sector constellations and private sector constellations.112 Organizational
structures within the private sector respond to the technical demands of their
environments.113 Structures are adopted, modified, or abandoned based on the
need for efficiency and effectiveness—and are traits measured in terms of
profitability.114 This metric can be used to assess one organization’s standing
vis-à-vis other similar organizations.115 If a competitor is doing better, there is
103. Id. at 50.
104. Id. at 51.
105. See id. at 42, 47–48.
106. See id. at 43, 53.
107. Id. at 54.
108. Innes et al., supra note 29, at 40, 49–50.
109. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited, 48 AM. SOC. REV.
147, 152 (1983).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES xi–xii (1980); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized
Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340 (1977); Willis
et al., supra note 66, at 147.
113. See Willis et al., supra note 66, at 150.
114. See id.
115. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 109, at 152.
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an effort to find out why and to perhaps change the organizational structure to
match the structure of the more successful entity.116
The dynamic in the public sector is fueled less by demonstrating
organizational effectiveness and more by demonstrating organizational
legitimacy.117 Public sector organizations operate in environments that have no
clear technology for achieving results, no clear metrics for measuring success,
and no clear link between an action and an outcome.118 Marshall Meyer and
Lynne Zucker define such organizations as permanently failing.119 They
survive despite an inability to demonstrate technical efficiency by substituting
demonstrations of conformity with culture demands and beliefs.120 They
operate in accordance with how the culture says an organization of this type
should operate.121
As noted above, the two models of organizational response have been
termed the technical model and the institutional model.122 In studies of police
agencies, the institutional model is ascendant.123 Again, this suggests strong
pressures on individual police agencies to become isomorphic with their
institutional environments.124
There are three sources of pressure toward isomorphism.125 When
organizations change in response to funding opportunities, or in response to
more powerful organizations—for example legislative committees—they are
experiencing coercive isomorphism.126 If the change is in response to licensure
requirements or accreditation criteria, there is normative pressure to
conform.127 Finally, if the organization itself seeks to mimic a successful
organization in the same institutional constellation, the conformity is described
as mimetic.128
All three conformity pressures are nicely illustrated in the recent history of
police agencies in the United States.129 In 1968, the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration was formed as part of the Johnson administration’s
116. See id.
117. See Giblin, supra note 72, at 644–45.
118. See Willis et al., supra note 66, at 151.
119. MARSHALL W. MEYER & LYNNE G. ZUCKER, PERMANENTLY FAILING ORGANIZATIONS
21–22 (1989).
120. See Willis et al., supra note 66, at 151–52.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 150.
123. Giblin, supra note 72, at 643.
124. Id. at 645.
125. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 109, at 150.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 152.
128. Id.
129. Gregory S. McNeal, Institutional Legitimacy and Counterterrorism Trials, 43 U. RICH.
L. REV. 967, 1009–10 (2009).
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war on crime.130 LEAA provided funding for a variety of innovations in law
enforcement from the adoption of night scopes and helicopters, to college
tuition for police officers.131 Much of the funding was apparently used to
purchase equipment of questionable value for the day-to-day tasks of civilian
law enforcement.132 But, for a time, armored personnel carriers, night scopes,
and helicopters were popular among urban police departments.133
Currently, many police agencies are demonstrating their legitimacy by
obtaining accreditation from The Commission on Accreditation for Law
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), “the gold standard in public safety.”134
Accreditation agencies spur normative conformity since the set of standards for
such recognition are standardized for the whole of the profession.135 CALEA
claims it is the gold standard among public safety accrediting bodies because
“[t]he primary cornerstones that comprise the CALEA Difference and
distinguish CALEA from all other forms of public safety accreditation are
professionalism, stewardship, integrity, diversity, independence, continuous
improvement, objectivity, credibility, consistency, knowledge, experience,
accountability and collaboration.”136
One is immediately struck by the lofty ambitions of the cornerstones and
the difficulty of measuring them. One suspects that the definitions of the terms
are operationalized on the ground through the application of tacit knowledge,
i.e. the phrase “I don’t know exactly what professionalism is, but I know it
when I see it.”
As noted previously, research on COMPSTAT suggests a mimetic
adoption.137 For example, Willis, et. al., in their study of COMPSTAT,
describe departments seeking to incorporate the strategy within their own
agencies after simply visiting New York, observing how it operated, and

130. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEAA/OJP RETROSPECTIVE: 30
YEARS OF FEDERAL SUPPORT TO STATE AND LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (1996), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/164509.pdf.
131. Id. at 3; LAW ENFORCEMENT DEV. GRP., THE AEROSPACE CORP., EVALUATION OF
AERIAL VEHICLES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION xviii–xix (1973), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/14211NCJRS.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, OVERVIEW OF ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION 7, 102 (1977).
132. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 130, at 4; U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 131, at 1, 16.
133. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION POLICE
EQUIPMENT SURVEY OF 1972 xiv, xviii (1974), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
Digitization/13985NCJRS.pdf.
134. CALEA Gold Standard, COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES, INC., http://www.calea.org/content/calea-gold-standard (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Willis et al., supra note 66, at 161.
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bringing it back to their own jurisdictions.138 There was no technical process of
adopting the strategy to local conditions, nor even a clear reason why it should
be adopted given the unique circumstances of the jurisdiction.139 It would be
hard to imagine a more idoneous example of mimetic adoption.
V. DATA, INFORMATION, AND KNOWLEDGE
In the philosophy of science, it is common to distinguish among the terms
data, information, and knowledge.140 Although the terms are often used
interchangeably,141 it is useful to distinguish them analytically to understand
both the problems and the prospects of achieving transparency and
accountability through the use of “better” intelligence.
Data are simply observations about phenomena.142 Information is data that
will make a difference.143 Knowledge is information that provides guidance for
action by describing relationships between means and ends.144 The differences
among these terms can be illustrated by the example of student test scores.145
The scores themselves are data.146 Arrayed to show that minority students do
worse than nonminority students, the data becomes information, particularly to
those interested in minority achievement.147 Were further analyses to suggest
what factors influence such achievement, and how a manager might
manipulate these factors, the information would achieve the status of
knowledge.148
As the reviews of various strategies for achieving transparency and
accountability suggest, much of what goes into the databases used for
achieving these ends remain simply data.149 Only occasionally is it processed
in a way to produce information.150 And rarely, indeed, is it raised to the level
of knowledge.151

138. Id. at 155.
139. Id. at 158.
140. ARNOLD J. MELTSNER & CHRISTOPHER BELLAVITA, THE POLICY ORGANIZATION 29
(1983).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 29–30.
143. Id. at 30.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 31.
146. MELTSNER & BELLAVITA, supra note 140, at 31.
147. Id.; James F. Gilsinan, Information and Knowledge Development Potential: The Public
vs. Private Sector Jobs Demonstration Project, 8 EVALUATION REV. 371, 375 (1984).
148. Id.
149. Elisabeth Rosenthal, I Disclose. . .Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, at SR.
150. Id.; MELTSNER & BELLAVITA, supra note 140, at 32.
151. Rosenthal, supra note 149; MELTSNER & BELLAVITA, supra note 140, at 32.
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Melvin Dubnick provides a useful list of the things accountability centered
reforms are thought to achieve.152 Accountability will enhance transparency
and, thus, strengthen democratic institutions (“the promise of democracy”).153
Abuses of authority will become apparent and correctable (“the promise of
justice”).154 Accountability will provide oversight of public officials promoting
appropriate behavior (“the promise of ethical behavior”).155 Improved
government service will result from accountability structures (“the promise of
performance”).156 Concentrating on the last of these, Dubnick convincingly
demonstrates that the supposed link between accountability and performance is
anything but certain.157
Linking accountability to the concept of account giving, Dubnick
demonstrates how account giving is contingent on the nature of, the reasons
for, the mode of, and the places where accounts are provided.158 In other
words, there is a performative nature to account giving itself, which makes its
relationship to actually influencing performance, in a technical sense,
problematic.159 People gather data for all sorts of reasons and give accounts to
achieve a variety of ends. As has been demonstrated throughout this Article,
data is molded into information that serves the immediate purposes of the
account giver, and these can be far removed from the original purposes for
gathering the data in the first place.160
The contingent nature of accounts and account giving suggests why
information seldom becomes knowledge.161 Instead, data and information
bounce back and forth between each other, as data is applied to and reported by
a variety of account givers and audiences.162
There is a similar intervening mechanism when one considers the
dynamics of transparency. Like accountability, transparency is thought to be
the holy grail of reform.163 More information can clean up campaign financing,
make consumers safer, and protect homebuyers from unscrupulous lenders.164
Why this in fact does not occur, as the last example clearly illustrates, is that
152. Melvin Dubnick, Accountability and the Promise of Performance: In Search of the
Mechanisms, 28 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 376, 376–77 (2005).
153. Id. at 376.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 377.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Dubnick, supra note 152, at 391–92, 397.
159. Id. at 391–92.
160. Id. at 380, 389–90.
161. See generally Gilsinan, supra note 147, at 374–75; Dubnick, supra note 152, at 398;
MELTSNER & BELLAVITA, supra note 140, at 32.
162. See generally Gilsinan, supra note 147, at 375–77; Dubnick, supra note 152, at 383–86.
163. Rosenthal, supra note 149; Dubnick, supra note 152, at 376–77, 385.
164. Luna, supra note 7, at 1164–65.
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transparency is thought to be achieved through the mechanism of disclosure.165
But disclosure is often in the form of data and information, thus lacking the
context necessary to be able to reasonably act on it.166 Anybody who has
bought a house understands that all of the disclosures produced on forms that
the home buyer is required to sign is data that no one has time to read. It fails
to even rise to the level of information. Similarly, detailed labels and
pamphlets accompanying many pharmaceuticals give a great deal of
information on potentially harmful side effects and negative drug interactions,
but, again, the detailed disclosure is often overwhelming, so it is left unread.
Hence, the irony—the higher the level of disclosure—the potentially lower
level of transparency.
As Elisabeth Rosenthal notes in her New York Times opinion piece, we
now live in a culture of disclosure where disclosure becomes an end in itself
rather than a means to an end.167 The result is less transparency as data dumps
become ways of obfuscating rather than enlightening.168
VI. CONCLUSION
The above analysis suggests at least three lessons concerning the quest for
greater transparency and accountability. Lesson one is there is no such thing as
immaculate perception, despite the allure of numbers suggesting otherwise.169
Numbers are always the end result of a process that requires a series of
judgments. These judgments are filtered through organizational, cultural, and
institutional environments which determine what gets counted and how.
Second, all attempts at transparency and accountability are mediated
through social performance mechanisms which alter the direct link between
data, information, and the technical process of applying the intelligence in
ways that achieve the desired ends.170 In the case of accountability, the
dynamics of account giving results in performative acts that may have little to
do with propelling organizational change—instead what is propelled is the
agenda of the account giver.171 The objective of that agenda is often to show
“good” numbers to enhance or protect one’s standing in the organization.172

165. Rosenthal, supra note 149.
166. JANICE GROSS STEIN, THE CULT OF EFFICIENCY 153–54 (2001).
167. Rosenthal, supra note 149.
168. Id.
169. See generally supra note 14 and accompanying text; STEIN, supra note 166, at 174–75;
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1491, 1503 (2005).
170. See supra notes 152, 158–159 and accompanying text.
171. Eterno & Silverman, supra note 40, at 228; Dubnick, supra note 152, at 396; STONE,
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This has certainly been the case with the implementation of COMPSTAT.173
Similarly, in the case of transparency, the mechanism of disclosure creates a
dynamic where disclosure becomes an end in itself.174 Thus, in many instances
data is provided, but not information or knowledge that can be acted on. Data
dumps then become a way of avoiding transparency.175
Finally, like brains, organizations appear to have two systems of
processing information.176 The dominant system depends on standard operating
procedures for assessing information and problem-solving.177 The key
mechanism of this system appears to be the use of analogy, i.e. how is this new
situation like one we have encountered before and what did we do then.178 This
satisficing approach is efficient, but not geared to either critical analysis or
fundamental organizational change.179 The critical thinking system of an
organization is seldom activated before the fact.180 Only when things have
gone terribly wrong does this system kick in to ask, “what happened and how
can this be avoided in the future?”181 Interestingly, the quest for accountability
and transparency has often been a product of this kind of analysis.182
Unfortunately, as this Article has demonstrated, once systems of accountability
and transparency become part of the standard operating procedure of an
organization, they lessen their ability to enhance either accountability or
transparency.183
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